Tuesday, July 3, 2012

Chapter 23 - The 50% Probability Principle


Chapter 23 - The 50% Probability Principle

The previous chapters discussed the invalidity of the Christian concept of a creator. The concept has been refuted through several topics and through the presented main evidence - The Book of Revelation. The current chapter will then be evaluating and providing evidence for two options:

(1) The possibility of a neutral creator.
or
(2) The possibility of the absence of a creator. In other words, no creator.

St. Thomas Aquinas' presentation on a possible Creator, the quinque viae, will also be evaluated briefly through evidence. Then St. Augustine of Hippo's free-will argument will also be discussed and evaluated. Blaise Pascal's wager will be presented with an alternative theory.
The evidence from the Bible and the Book of Revelation will be given first. The reason for the evidence from these sources is to suggest that the supposed writers of the Bible are considered natural writers despite the seemingly "religious" overtones. Therefore; as natural writers, deriving their source of inspiration from a natural source rather than from a supernatural source, it would be reasonable to use these sources. Therefore, the Bible is an example and source of social evolution rather than deriving from a supernatural source. Furthermore, it would suggest that these said sources contain both errors and facts. In other words, the sources mentioned are imperfect or fallible rather than absolutely perfect or infallible. The prime question is: Revelation over Reason or Reason over Revelation? I prefer the later as the proper conclusion.

Examples below from the Bible itself:


Exodus 15:2 - " The Lord is a man of war: the Lord is his name".

Isaiah 45:7 - "I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the Lord do all these things".

Deuteronomy 32:39 - "See now that I, even I, am he, and there is no god with me: I kill, and I make alive; I wound, and I heal: neither is there any that can deliver out of my hand".

Revelation 6:8 - "And I looked and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat on him was Death, and Hell followed with him. And power was given unto them over the fourth part of the earth, to kill with sword, and with hunger, and with death, and with the beasts of the earth".

Evidence from Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica The Five Ways :

1.      The Argument of the Unmoved Mover
Prima autem et manifestior via est, quæ sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur, movet autem aliquid secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum, de potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa, quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.
[The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.]

Evidence against the Unmoved Mover theory: The Sol star or sun is both mover and moved. The behaviour of the galaxy creates the conditions of its composition and creation. There also different types of galaxies with stars in them. Galaxies also collide with each other and some are not spiral types. Galaxies are also moving in several directions. Is it possible that the movement of galaxies are infinite rather than originating from one Unmoved Mover? If there was one "bang" is it possible that chemical conditions created the bang rather than a mover? The formation of ice is a prime example where chemical conditions changes water into ice by simply lowering the temperature in a controlled environment. All of the previous information was gathered years after the statement by Thomas Aquinas which is an example of social evolution. No object moves itself unless it has free-will or guided by another object but this would mean that the Unmoved Mover has been identified in possessing a quality of the created: free-will. For instance, "the fire and wood" analogy mentioned by Thomas Aquinas. These objects has no free-will but it is guided by another agent - the sentient human being. The question arises: Objects which contain free-will derived from objects without free-will? For example, earlier chemicals evolved into human beings on Earth. The variable of "free-will"(from natural evolution) refutes the Unmoved Mover theory. Finally, thinking robots or artificial life-forms are made from computer chips which does not contain "free-will".

2. The Argument of the First Cause
Secunda via est ex ratione causæ efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile. Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remota autem causa, removetur effectus, ergo, si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causæ efficientes mediæ, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant.
[The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.]

Evidence against the First Cause theory: There is no first cause, there is just cause and effect. The cycle of the four seasons on Earth is a prime example of the very highly probable and natural conclusion of an infinite cause and effect. The supposition of "Hell" and "Heaven", if believed, validates the idea of an infinite cause and effect. In other words, the belief of predestination and value of the afterlife validates infinite cause and effect. Finally, there is no first cause through natural and supposed supernatural examples. Even though; by natural means, it could be deducted that there was a "big bang" for the universe, the said event could not validate the existence of a creator. The suggestion of the term - First - would suggest a creator which could not be proven and therefore it is just "cause and effect".

3. The Argument from Contingency
Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, quæ talis est. Invenimus enim in rebus quædam quæ sunt possibilia esse et non esse, cum quædam inveniantur generari et corrumpi, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossibile est autem omnia quæ sunt, talia esse, quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, quia quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et sic modo nihil esset, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia sunt possibilia, sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus. Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suæ necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum in necessariis quæ habent causam suæ necessitatis, sicut nec in causis efficientibus, ut probatum est. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis, quod omnes dicunt Deum.
[The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence – which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.]

Evidence against the Contingency theory: St. Anselm of Canterbury in his treatise, Cur Deus Homo or Why God became Man, offered his opinion on this subject. He presented the 'Greatest Conceivable Being' or GCB theory. The GCB theory is to suggest that when a person imagines a being that being is neither created nor destroyed then this being is God or the creator. Gaunilo, his opposing contemporary of the era, offered an interesting rebuttal: Imagine the 'Greatest Conceivable Island'. The obvious becomes tantamount to a natural "sin": the imagination could be wrong or theories are flawed. In other words, just because an object is imagined does not make it a fact or true. Therefore, the 'Greatest Conceivable Being' develops into a relativistic opinion or an absurdity rather than an absolute fact. The alternative theory is to present that the origin of "free-will" derives from natural reactions rather than from 'divine' predestination. For example, the creation of the universe from an unthinking group of chemicals into a group of reacting molecules forced by natural pressure and gravity. Then these natural molecules developed into bacteria which developed naturally into other life-forms. In other words; the factor of "free-will", deriving from a natural source, refutes the GCB theory and the argument from Contigency. Let me interject a possible hypothesis: In the early phases of the universe only thinking molecules possibly existed and then sentient thinking gaseous life-forms developed before any other type of sentient thinking life-forms existed later and elsewhere. The previous interjection proves that GCB and the contingency theory, which derived from the mind or a priori, are not proven theories therefore flawed.

4.The Argument from Degree
Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile, et sic de aliis hujusmodi. Sed magis et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est, sicut magis calidum est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per consequens maxime ens, nam quæ sunt maxime vera, sunt maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quæ sunt illius generis, sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cujuslibet perfectionis, et hoc dicimus Deum.
[The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii.. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.]

Evidence against the Degree theory: There is neither "good" nor "evil" concerning the increase of temperature because it derives from chemical reactions which do not contain free-will. The source of "good" and "evil"; in summary, derive from social evolution, social constructs and therefore natural free-will. The previous supposition will be elaborated further in later chapters. The designations of "good" and "evil" both derive from free-will or free choice from naturally thinking and sentient beings. Therefore, "good" and "evil" derive from the reactions of others(agents) as they observe and react to actions from an acting agent.
5.The Teleological Argument
Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum. Videmus enim quod aliqua quæ cognitione carent, scilicet corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem, quod apparet ex hoc quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut consequantur id quod est optimum; unde patet quod non a casu, sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem. Ea autem quæ non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum.
[The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.]

Evidence against the Teleological argument: The reacting agents define what is "good" and "evil" therefore creating the limits and range of a sole acting agent. All the previous agents behave under a socially evolved contract or agreed evolved laws. For example; the court system, especially in the U.S., is an example of trial and error therefore enacting precedence. The collective decision by a group of individuals(reacting agents), a jury, is enacted and agreed upon. These reacting agents decides if the past acts of an individual(acting agent) is justified or unjustified. Chemicals also have laws to follow based on the natural environment or the natural laws of the universe. The existence of natural laws is a moot point on the existence of a creator or God.

St. Augustine's Fixed Cause Fallacy:

The argument presented above by Thomas Aquinas started from the observations of St.Augustine. The core of the argument could be seen by St. Augustine of Hippo through his attempted refutation against Cicero. Augusine says:
" But when Cicero denies that the order of all causes is completely fixed and perfectly known to God's foreknowledge we execrate his opinion even more than do the Stoics "(Source: City of God, Book 5 - Chapter 9).
Then Augustine continues in the following chapter - concerning God's universal providence:
" he has not left them without a harmony of their constituent parts, a kind of peace. "(Source: City of God, Book 5 - Chapter 11).
The evidence above explains two things:
(1) Thomas Aquinas five ways or argument derive from the previous observation given by St. Augustine many years earlier. The Five Ways were written between A.D.1265- A.D.1274 and St. Augustine wrote his treatise, City of God, between A.D. 413 - A.D. 430. In the presented timeline, it is clearly observed there was definitely strong influence passed on to the next scholar because of the terms and phrases used which were later borrowed.
(2) The order of the fallacy could be traced back to John, the writer of the Book of Revelation, and also these errors could be traced to the Old Testament canon or texts. The Stoics, the religious Roman believers of various Gods, also were exposed by Cicero to believe in a similar fallacy. Through the reaction of St.Augustine, the fallacy of a fixed cause could be presented.
Where is the absurdity?
St. Augustine's thesis is Free-will or free choice is fixed by the Christian God. The anti-thesis: the rational option, is the supposition and the belief that Free-will or free choice is unfixed.
St. Augustine of Hippo presents his thesis summarized in one statement: " Hence we are in no way compelled either to preserve God's prescience by abolishing our free will, or to safeguard our free will by denying (blasphemously) the divine foreknowledge "(Source: City of God, Book 5 - Chapter 10).
The previous thesis statement above was an accumulation of the observation from the previous chapter in St.Augustine's book. The previous chapter, chapter 9 of the same Book 5, is titled: God's foreknowledge and man's free will; a criticism of Cicero. In other words, Augustine was presenting the absurd rationale: fixed cause means fixed effect. Therefore, attempting to validate the existence of predestination or his concept of Christian "destiny". Furthermore; according to Augustine, and later elaborated by St. Thomas Aquinas, the belief of "First Cause" equates to predestination or fixed effect.
The problem of the previous fallacy is the existence of "free-will" conjoined with the two destinations for "souls": Heaven and Hell. Then the continuation of actions and reactions, by "souls", in the so-called afterlife. The core of the fallacy is "First" Cause deriving from so-called fixed cause.
The list and statements by St. Augustine of Hippo, within the previous stated chapter of his book, with a rebuttal:
1 ) " If the order of events is determined, so is the causal order; for nothing can happen unless preceded by an efficient cause. If the causal order is fixed, determining all events, then all events, he concludes, are ordered by destiny. If this is true, nothing depends on us and there is no such thing as free will". REBUTTAL: Cicero's observation and conclusion, in the previous statement paraphrased by Augustine in his book, is valid. Cicero's negation of "foreknowledge" was proven but Augustine later calls it "absurd". Therefore; as an early naturalist and materialist, Cicero discredited not only the Christian belief system but also the beliefs of the Stoics. The problem of Augustine is that he uses a logical fallacy to counter Cicero's argument.
2 ) " If we choose foreknowledge, free will is annihilated; if we choose free will, prescience is abolished". REBUTTAL: Cicero is correct but Augustine continues with his presentation but it has already been proven that efficient cause is unfixed. The error of Augustine is the use of Free-will with 'cause and effect' to prove the existence of God or the Christian God.
3 ) " if there is free will, everything does not happen by fate; if everything does not happen by fate, there is not a fixed order of all causes; if there is not a fixed order of all causes, there is not a fixed order of events for the divine prescience, for these events cannot take place unless preceded by efficient causes; if there is not a fixed order for God's prescience, everything does not happen as he has foreknown them as due to happen. Thus, he concludes, if everything does not happen as foreknown by God, then there is in him no foreknowledge of all the future". REBUTTAL: The problem by Augustine is the usage of the term "fixed" but the end result of "predestination"(not destiny), expressed within Augustine's belief system, negates the idea of a rational unfixed cause and effect. This is the reason why I mentioned earlier that the term "first" cause is invalid in Thomas Aquinas' second argument concerning First Cause. Therefore, it is possible to separate a neutral creator with an unfixed cause. Simply, "cause and effect" or causality is a natural process and it does not prove nor disprove a creator. However; the previous presentation, in volumes, disproves the idea of a Christian creator or the idea of a "fixed" cause which results in a "fixed" effect (For example, Heaven and Hell for "souls"). Also, the validity of Paul's and John's predictions or so-called prophecies were proven flawed.
4 ) " God knows all things before they happen and that we do by our free will everything that we feel and know would not happen without our volition. We do not say that everything is fated; in fact we deny that anything happens by destiny. For we have shown that the notion of destiny, in the accepted sense, referring to conjunction of stars at the time of conception or birth, has no validity, since it asserts something which has no reality. It is not that we deny a causal order where the will of God prevails; but we do not describe it by the word 'fate', unless perhaps if we understand fate to be derived from fari(speak), that is from the act of speaking". REBUTTAL: Augustine continues in the frame of thought concerning the flawed - fixed cause and fixed effect. In other words, attempting to verify or justify predestination. Nevertheless, Augustine attempts to separate the fate understood by the Stoics and the "fate" or predestination believed by the Christians but he still fails to differentiate the two.
5 ) " Now if there is for God a fixed order of all causes, it does not follow that nothing depends on our free choice. Our wills themselves are in the order of causes, which is, for God, fixed, and is contained in his foreknowledge, since human acts of will are the causes of human activities. Therefore he who had prescience of the causes of all events certainly could not be ignorant of our decisions, which he foreknows as the causes of our actions". REBUTTAL: Augustine again presents his theory - Fixed (First) Cause --> Fixed Effect (Predestination). Foreknowledge makes everyone's actions, free-will or free choice, linear to a predestined result(predestination) from a fixed effect. The previous linear thinking leads to the obvious model - First Cause --> First Effect. In reality, our actions and free-will or free choice is non-linear therefore leading to several effects. The proper theory is therefore presented - First Cause --> Several (Multiple) Effects. Or rather 'cause and effect' or causality which is empirically known through the behavior of a probable 'big bang' of the universe. The previous observation also refutes Thomas Aquinas' earlier idea of an Unmoved Mover because it could not be proven. Which leads to the 50% probability principle: The possibility of a neutral creator or the possibility concerning the absence of a creator(no creator).
The rest of the chapter located within St. Augustine's book repeats his position and subjects which were already discussed. Augustine goes to introduce the idea of supernatural causes with natural causes which are irrelevant to the foregone conclusion.
Therefore, our actions or free-will could not prove nor disprove the existence of a creator. Furthermore, our actions or free-will should be to enjoin good and forbid evil. The error by St. Augustine was to defend the religion of Christianity by utilizing these natural reactions to discredit the arguments by the "pagan" Romans. The capture and destruction of Rome by Alaric in A.D. 410 was then illogically seen by the populace as an "omen", hence, the debate between Roman Christians and Roman Pagans which compelled Augustine to compose the book and argument (A.D. 413 - A.D. 430). The actual title of the book is Concerning the City of God against the Pagans or in Latin - De Civitate Dei contra Paganos.
The above is proof St. Augustine of Hippo, despite his true insights in some subjects, was still holding on to the fallacy of predestination (or "fate" or "destiny") and several flawed superstitions in connection with "predestination". The reason is because of his usage of "free-will" and "cause and effect" to prove the existence of a creator. The root of this fallacy started out in his belief of the Book of Revelation written by John. The confirmation concerning the flawed concept of predestination is stated through the term - "Alpha and Omega" (Revelation 1:8,1:11,21:6, and 22:13). Furthermore, contained in the verses of Revelation 1:11 and 22:13 it has "...first and the last..." which is a confirmation of the fallacy of predestination or "fate".
There once lived a fanatic in France, by the name of Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), who wrote Pensees which details how to force non-Christians into becoming Christians. The proof through the life of Blaise Pascal proves that one could be fanatical and a genius simultaneously. The book of Pensees contains a formula or a wager or bet concerning the predestination of "souls". However; the said book also proves that our free-will is not part of the predestination of any creator because why control the environment and variables of the life of a disbeliever, to force them to believe, if predestination exist? Well, Blaise Pascal is not perfect.
The reason for his genius lays in the fact that he developed a theory or a formula which is commonly in use today. Blaise Pascal developed four formulas: Pascal's wager, Pascal's triangle, Pascal's law, and Pascal's theorem. There are three formulas which could be used to disprove the previous problem of predestination. The mathematical and geometric formula of Pascal's theorem is not relevant in any form to the presentation and will not be used. Therefore, the previous life of Blaise Pascal proves that even through the writing and mental illness of a fanatical "religious" individual, natural laws could still be calculated. The previous rationale of why the Bible still contains natural truths in the midst of the flawed writings of a supposedly supernatural deity.
The workings of Pascal's law describes that a change of pressure in any part of a liquid within a container(controlled environment) equally redistributes to the rest of the liquid. The previous proves that David Hume's dictum of - one could not derive an 'ought' from an 'is' - especially true if anyone uses Pascal's law to prove St.Augustine's and Aquinas' fixed (first) cause. The error is the controlled environment of such equal redistribution of nature. For example, our actions and reactions are not under a controlled environment of predestination. The supposed absurdity within Pascal's Pensees proves social control to change someone's belief system, especially in the natural environment of free choice or free-will, to be futile and even foolish.
The next formula of interest is Pascal's triangle which describes the order of numbers. The top of the triangle would be a "1" which is k = 0. This could be represented, for the presented argument, as our own actions. The numbers below,"1", are "1+1" the visible reactions and therefore the next row below is developed: "1+2+1". If this goes on, the value of ( 1 ) would still be expressed on both sides of the triangle. The imagination develops a flawed theory: The final destination of both ( 1 ), on the side of the triangle, leads to either "heaven" or "hell". The problem with the previous flawed theory would be the existence and the destinations of various numbers located between the value of both ( 1 ) on the side of the triangle. Therefore, through example or rather the analogy of Pascal's triangle, the proof of 'First Cause to Multiple Effects' is proven. Therefore, the theory presented by St. Augustine of Hippo, of 'Fixed Cause' is refuted.
The conclusion is given: no fixed cause and no fixed effect or no predestination. Therefore, the refutation of predestination negates the existence of "heaven" and "hell". In other words, there is no "heaven" and there is no "hell". Furthermore, there are no angels and there are no demons. The concept of "Original Sin" disappears as this is also connected with the ceremonies of the original Jewish priests of the Temple/Tabernacle structures. The story of 'Adam and Eve' is now a work of fiction by the writers of the Old Testament. Finally; our actions have been freed from "omen(s)","fate", and "destiny". Furthermore, the terms of "blessing(s)" and "curse(s)" no longer exist. All the said previous terms are connected with the previous fictional works and superstitions.
The presentation of Pascal's wager is now given. I will present my point of view to the wager and later explain why. The alternative terms will be discussed and why they were not used. I prefer using my point of view because it is the view of a reasonable reacting agent rather than the view of the acting agent(Blaise Pascal). The former view will be shown to be the reasonable view and the later the irrational one. The whole contents of the text are given with a proposed summary. The dialectical convergence is now shown between the proposed 50% probability and the said wager:

"Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason for
their belief, since they profess a religion for which they cannot give
a reason? They declare, in expounding it to the world, that it is a
foolishness, stultitiam; [28] and then you complain that they do not
prove it! If they proved it, they would not keep their word; it is in
lacking proofs that they are not lacking in sense. "Yes, but although
this excuses those who offer it as such and takes away from them the
blame of putting it forward without reason, it does not excuse those
who receive it." Let us then examine this point, and say, "God is, or
He is not." But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide
nothing here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is
being played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or
tails will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can
do neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can
defend neither of the propositions.
Do not, then, reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you
know nothing about it. "No, but I blame them for having made, not this
choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who
chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The
true course is not to wager at all."
Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which
will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see
which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and
the good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your
knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun,
error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather
than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point
settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in
wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain,
you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without
hesitation that He is. "That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may
perhaps wager too much." Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of
gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one,
you might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would
have to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you
would be imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your
life to gain three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and
gain. But there is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being
so, if there were an infinity of chances, of which one only would be
for you, you would still be right in wagering one to win two, and you
would act stupidly, being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one
life against three at a game in which out of an infinity of chances
there is one for you, if there were an infinity of an infinitely happy
life to gain. But there is here an infinity of an infinitely happy life
to gain, a chance of gain against a finite number of chances of loss,
and what you stake is finite. It is all divided; where-ever the
infinite is and there is not an infinity of chances of loss against
that of gain, there is no time to hesitate, you must give all. And
thus, when one is forced to play, he must renounce reason to preserve
his life, rather than risk it for infinite gain, as likely to happen as
the loss of nothingness. "

(SOURCE: Pensees; Section 3: Of the Necessity of the Wager, Point 233 - 7th through 9th paragraphs)


The proposed summary of Pascal's wager:
* If God exist and I believe = Infinite Gain ("Heaven")
* If God exist and I don't believe = Infinite Loss ("Hell")
* If God does not exist and I believe = Reason Lost
* If God does not exist and I don't believe = Reason Gained

All the previous evidence guides any sane individual to the conclusion that the God of Augustine does not exist along with the 'Fixed Cause' fallacy or predestination. I added "Reason" rather than "Temporal" or "Material" because there's evidence within Pensees that Blaise Pascal also attacked Rene Descartes' usage of the term "Reason". Blaise Pascal is criticizing, early, cartesian rationalism which states reason alone guarantees knowledge. The problem of both Blaise Pascal and Rene Descartes is the foundation of a flawed belief system in which is used to conclude their theories. Of course, we have the words of Blaise Pascal himself: the individual "must renounce reason" to preserve one's life.

What is the rationale derived from reason to explain our actions? The given theory of Pascal's triangle will be borrowed again in the next presentation. The proposed theory is given and presented as 'Probability wager':
* If no neutral creator do good works = Positive charge into society
* If no neutral creator no good works = Negative charge into society
* If neutral creator exist do good works = Positive charge into society
* If neutral creator exist no good works = Negative charge into society

The above is true among all individuals despite their various belief system or the lack of a belief system. The 'utility' of our action does not in any way proves or disproves the existence of a neutral creator it simply verifies our existence as contributors to society. The above 'Probability wager' leaves the question unanswered concerning a deity or creator and concentrates on the behavior of individuals - the end result of our actions. The flip of the coin (50% result), referenced and hinted by Blaise Pascal in Pensees, is left alone and the importance of the end result of any actions towards every individual is concentrated on.

The subject concerning "positive" and "negative" charge into society, by each individual in society, is discussed in the following chapter. The proceeding chapter discusses the highly probable origin of "positive" and "negative" charges and their results. The role of the acting agent and the various reacting agents, within society, have been proven through Pascal's triangle and the consequent 'Probability Wager'.


The acting agent is the sole individual and everyone else in society is the reacting agents. The subject concerning "God" exists outside of the acting agents and therefore would be a projected agent. The projected agent could be "God", the state or another object. There are two types of projected agents: proven projected agents and unproven projected agents. For example, the idea or belief of a neutral creator could not be verified or proven while the idea of a state entity could be proven. For instance, when a child is born it knows nothing and is born with a "blank slate". The previous term was used by John Locke(1632-1704) and called the previous state of being as "tabula rasa". Therefore, through our experiences there are two types of projected agents: Proven and Unproven. Hence, the reason for the 50% probability principle in proving at least the existence of a neutral creator.


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